Liquidity Constrained Exporters by Chaney, Thomas
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control
Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 72 (2016) 141–154http://d
0165-18
☆ This
E-mjournal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jedcLiquidity constrained exporters$
Thomas Chaney
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse Capitole, 21 Allée de Brienne, 31000 Toulouse, Francea r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 22 November 2015
Received in revised form
29 March 2016
Accepted 30 March 2016
Available online 5 April 2016
Keywords:
International trade
Liquidity constraint
Heterogeneous ﬁrms
JEL classiﬁcation:
F1x.doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2016.03.010
89/& 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
paper was initially written as a chapter of
ail address: thomas.chaney@gmail.coma b s t r a c t
I propose a model of international trade with liquidity constraints. If ﬁrms must pay a
ﬁxed entry cost in order to access foreign markets, and if they face liquidity constraints to
ﬁnance these costs, only those ﬁrms that have sufﬁcient liquidity are able to export. A set
of ﬁrms could proﬁtably export, but are prevented from doing so because they lack suf-
ﬁcient liquidity. More productive ﬁrms that generate large liquidity from their domestic
sales, and wealthier ﬁrms that inherit a large amount of liquidity, are more likely to
export. This model offers a potential explanation for the apparent lack of sensitivity of
exports to exchange rate ﬂuctuations. When the exchange rate appreciates, existing
exporters lose competitiveness abroad, and are forced to reduce their exports. At the same
time, the value of domestic assets owned by potential exporters increases. Some liquidity
constrained exporters start exporting. This dampens the anti-competitiveness impact of a
currency appreciation. Under some conditions, it may reverse it altogether and increase
aggregate exports. In this sense, the model is able to rationalize the co-existence of
competitive devaluations and competitive revaluations.
& 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Traditional trade models view the patterns of imports and exports mainly as the outcome of a competition game
between producers in different countries. If goods from a given country become cheaper, provided that demand is not too
inelastic, producers export larger quantities. Eventually, general equilibrium adjustments will have to take place to restore
trade balance, but in the short and medium run, we should observe export expansion arising from a devaluation. The only
departure from this competition mechanism may happen in the very short run, and has been described as the J-curve: if
demand is inelastic in the very short run, a devaluation may have a negative impact on the current account in the short run,
before the competitiveness effect comes into play and exports catch up. However, we observe relatively little response of
trade ﬂows to exchange rate ﬂuctuations. The euro-dollar exchange rate has experienced wide ﬂuctuations since the
inception of the euro, without any signiﬁcant and systematic effect on the patterns of trade between Europe and the US. In
the early 2000s, the US dollar steadily depreciated vis á vis most foreign currencies, without any evidence of a reduction in
the US trade deﬁcit. In a different context, many middle income countries underwent massive devaluations of their currency
without much gain in terms of current account imbalances. One way to reconcile the observed impact of exchange rate
ﬂuctuations with the existing theory of competitive trade is to assume extremely inelastic demands for foreign goods. Such
elasticities are at odds with other evidence of the impact of trade barriers on trade ﬂows.my Ph.D. dissertation. First draft: March 2005.
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evidence on the characteristics of exporters. The main predictions of the model are, ﬁrst, that liquidity constraints are a key
determinant of the export behavior of ﬁrms, and second, that exchange rate ﬂuctuations (or more generally ﬂuctuations of
relative prices) may have the opposite effect as predicted by traditional theories. If there are ﬁxed costs associated with
exporting, then liquidity constraints at the ﬁrm level will come into play. In such a context, fewer ﬁrms will be able to
export. Furthermore, an appreciation of the domestic currency, despite the negative effect on the competitiveness of
exporters, will have a mild impact on aggregate exports, even if demand is elastic. It may actually have a positive impact on
exports in the medium run if goods are not too substitutable.
The reason is the following. In the presence of ﬁxed costs associated with exporting and liquidity constraints, some ﬁrms
could proﬁtably export, but they are prevented from doing because they cannot gather sufﬁcient liquidity. Only those ﬁrms
that are productive enough and generate sufﬁcient internal liquidity from their domestic sales are able to export. If the
exchange rate appreciates, potential exporters lose competitiveness abroad and therefore lose some market shares abroad.
Existing exporters reduce their exports. This is the traditional competitiveness effect. But an appreciation of the exchange
rate also means that the value of domestic assets abroad increases. Some ﬁrms that could not enter foreign markets because
of liquidity constraints enter now that the value of their assets has appreciated. Total trade does not change much: existing
exporters export less, but new ﬁrms start exporting. Under some conditions, aggregate exports may increase following an
appreciation of the exchange rate.
In other words, it is the extensive margin of trade that responds differently to exchange rate ﬂuctuations in the presence
of ﬁrm heterogeneity and liquidity constraints. Following an exchange rate appreciation, some ﬁrms, due to the increased
value of their domestic assets, enter the export market. This entry of exporters, the extensive margin of trade, may offset the
reduction of the volumes exported by existing exporters, the intensive margin of trade. The strength of this effect depends
on how competitive markets are, what fraction of ﬁxed export costs are denominated in foreign currency, and whether ﬁrms
own liquid assets and have access to developed ﬁnancial markets.
This theory also accounts for the fact that few ﬁrms export, and that exporters will typically be ﬁrms that are not liquidity
constrained. There is a large body of empirical evidence from micro-data that only a small fraction of ﬁrms export and
exporters are more productive than non-exporters, they are larger and more capital intensive. I develop a model where the
selection into the export market is similar. Only those ﬁrms that are not liquidity constrained are able to export. The capacity
to overcome liquidity constraints is endogenously determined in this model. Firms may have sufﬁcient assets, inherited
from their past activities, but they can also generate sufﬁcient cash ﬂow from their domestic activities in order to gain access
to foreign markets. In equilibrium, only a subset of ﬁrms are able to gather enough liquidity and export. The export status is
the outcome of the characteristics of the ﬁrm, even though the partition between exporters and non-exporters is endo-
genously determined as the outcome of a competitive game.
Finally, this model has important implications for the link between ﬁnancial development, macroeconomic stability and
openness to trade. The model predicts that a deepening or a widening of the ﬁnancial markets will increase total exports.
When ﬁrms get easier access to external ﬁnance (a deepening of ﬁnancial markets), or when more ﬁrms get access to cheap
external ﬁnance (a widening of the ﬁnancial markets), they become able to overcome barriers associated with international
trade. More ﬁrms export, and total exports increase. However, the model does not predict that better ﬁnancial markets will
either stabilize or destabilize the current account. The predictions of the model about the volatility of exports and the
degree of ﬁnancial development are ambiguous. Only in the extreme case of perfect ﬁnancial markets are exports more
volatile than if ﬁnancial markets were not perfectly developed. Exchange rate ﬂuctuations, for instance, will cause larger
movements of the volume of exports if ﬁnancial markets are perfectly developed than if they are not. The reason is the
following. If ﬁnancial markets are not perfectly developed, there exists a fringe of liquidity constrained exporters. When the
exchange rate appreciates, some of those liquidity constrained ﬁrms start exporting. This entry of new exporters dampens
the negative impact of the exchange rate appreciation on existing exporters. If ﬁnancial markets are perfectly developed,
meaning that no ﬁrm is liquidity constrained, this dampening channel does not exist anymore. Exports will be more
responsive to exchange rate ﬂuctuations. This is the only case where the model makes a clear prediction about the link
between ﬁnancial development and current account volatility. For intermediate levels of development on the other hand, an
improvement of ﬁnancial markets will always increase total exports, but it may or may not increase export volatility. The
primary purpose of this model is not to describe the link between ﬁnancial development and macroeconomic instability.
However it offers an interesting angle on a potential link between the volatility of some aggregates (ﬂuctuations in the
volume of exports here), and the degree of ﬁnancial development. It also gives speciﬁc predictions for the impact of ﬁnancial
development on the volume of exports.
In the remaining part of this Introduction, I review the literature related to this model. First, recent research has
documented the importance of ﬁrm heterogeneity and the role of ﬁxed costs in international trade, both empirically and
theoretically. Second, there is a large body of literature on the importance of liquidity constraints for ﬁrms. Finally, there is a
growing literature on the interaction between ﬁrm level liquidity constraints and international trade.
Firm heterogeneity is a major feature of the export behavior of ﬁrms. Exporters are different from non-exporters in many
respects. They tend to be more productive, larger, more capital intensive. The link between productivity and trade has been
analyzed in many countries: Bernard and Jensen (1999, 2001a,b, 2002) for the US, Aw and Huang (1995) for Taiwanese and
Korean ﬁrms, Clerides et al. (1998) for Colombian, Mexican and Moroccan ﬁrms, and Delgado et al. (2002) for Spanish ﬁrms,
to name a few early contributions. This paper extends the study of the heterogeneity between exporters and non-exporters
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exporters may differ from non-exporters is their ability to access ﬁnancial intermediaries. Less ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms
are more likely to export.
The dichotomy between exporters and non-exporters allows the extensive margin of trade, the entry and exit of ﬁrms
into the export market, to play a crucial role in determining the volume of trade ﬂows. When trade barriers change, or when
the degree of competition in foreign markets evolves, some ﬁrms will go in and out of the export markets. The importance
of the extensive margin of trade has been pointed out since the seminal work of Krugman (1980). Trade is as much about the
quantity each exporting ﬁrm exports, as it is about how many ﬁrms export. Empirically, in the medium run, most of the
adjustment for aggregate trade ﬂows comes from entry and exit of ﬁrms into the export market. Eaton et al. (2011), using
data on French exporters, disaggregated by trading partner, show that most of the variation in aggregate French exports
comes from variation in the number of exporters, rather than differences of exports per ﬁrm. Helpman et al. (2004) use the
zeros of trade matrices (which happenwhen no ﬁrm trades between two countries) to infer information about the extensive
margin of trade, and derive an estimate of trade barriers between countries. Broda and Weinstein (2006) point out that in
the last 30 years, the number of varieties of foreign goods available to US consumers has increased fourfold, and contributed
to an additional increase in welfare worth 2.6% of GDP over 30 years.
Ruhl (2008) uses a theoretical framework with heterogeneous ﬁrms to show that the extensive margin of trade may
explain the discrepancy between the short run and long run elasticities of trade with respect to trade barriers. Ruhl argues
that high frequency variations in exchange rates, because exchange rates are mean reverting, will trigger only negligible
adjustments of the extensive margin, which explains why exchange rate ﬂuctuations seem to have so little impact on trade
ﬂows, whereas variations in tariffs or quotas have such a large impact. This paper builds on this literature and studies the
extensive margin of trade in the presence of liquidity constraints. If ﬁnancial markets are underdeveloped, the extensive
margin of trade changes due to both productivity differences across ﬁrms and differences in the severity of liquidity con-
straints they face. Predictions of traditional models of trade may be modiﬁed, or even overturned. I offer an alternative
explanation for the relatively mild impact of exchange rate ﬂuctuations from that of Ruhl (2008). Even if the extensive
margin of trade does respond to exchange rate movements, since there will be simultaneous entry and exit of ﬁrms, the
impact on aggregate exports will be mild. When the exchange rate appreciates, some existing exporters lose competi-
tiveness in the foreign market and stop exporting. At the same time, the value of domestic assets denominated in foreign
currency increases, so that liquidity constrained ﬁrms start exporting. The net effect on the extensive margin is mild. While
both my and Ruhl's model predict the same qualitative difference between the elasticity of trade with respect to tariffs
changes versus exchange rate shocks, the mechanisms are different. By interacting exchange rate shocks with measures of
external ﬁnance dependence and ﬁnancial development, as well as by distinguishing the impact of exchange rate shocks on
the extensive margin for small versus large incumbent exporters, one can test for the relative importance of my model
versus Ruhl's in explaining the international elasticity puzzle.
I build on the Melitz model and add liquidity constraints to it. Those liquidity constraints interact with productivity
heterogeneity. The most productive ﬁrms generate enough liquidity from domestic sales to overcome any liquidity con-
straints. However, some less productive ﬁrms would be proﬁtable enough to export, but are prevented from doing so
because they are liquidity constrained. On top of interacting liquidity constraints with productivity heterogeneity, one
important contribution of this model is to break up the symmetry in country sizes and wages imposed in Melitz (2003).
Exchange rate ﬂuctuations in my model are equivalent to ﬂuctuations in relative real wages in different countries. This
formalization is similar to the one used by Atkeson and Burstein (2008).
There is a vast literature on the importance of liquidity constraints for ﬁrms, which follows the pioneering work of
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Fazzari et al. (1988) study the importance of ﬁnancing constraints for investment. The importance
of the lending channel has been stressed in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), as well as in Stein (1998). Empirically Bernanke
and Gertler (1995) and Kashyap and Stein (2000) study the importance of credit constraints for banks. Gertler and Gilchrist
(1994) show small ﬁrms' production contracts when money is tight, which is further evidence of the importance of liquidity
constraints. Hoshi et al. (1994) offer a model where net worth determines whether to use direct or indirect ﬁnance.
Liquidity constraints in my model are introduced in the simplest way possible: a collateral constraint. This is the reduced
form expression of an unmodelled game between potential ﬁnancial intermediaries and potential exporters. However, in the
presence of productivity heterogeneity, liquidity constraints will interact with trade barriers, exchange rates, ﬁrm level
productivity in a complex way. Domestic sales may endogenously relax the liquidity constraints faced by a potential
exporter. Manova (2013) tests some of the predictions from this model at the sectoral level. In particular, she ﬁnds that trade
is lower in sectors that rely more heavily on external ﬁnance and in countries where ﬁnancial markets are less developed.
Foley and Manova (2015) give a survey on the recent literature on trade and ﬁnancing frictions. Fitzgerald and Haller (2015),
using a panel of Irish exporters, ﬁnd that trade is more affected by tariff changes than by exchange rate shocks, and that
most of the difference is accounted for by the extensive margin of trade. Amiti and Konings (2007) present evidence that
imported intermediates (denominated in foreign currency) affect ﬁrms ability to export, which contribute to an attenuation
of the impact of exchange rate shocks on exports. The evidence in both Fitzgerald and Haller (2015) and Amiti and Konings
(2007) are consistent with both my model, and the Ruhl (2008) model. Finally, Bonﬁglioli et al. (2015) propose an elegant
model with ﬁnancing frictions and endogenous entry, where ﬁnancing frictions systematically affect the ex post distribution
of ﬁrms' productivities: if ﬁrms expect ﬁnancing will be costly, they will endogenously choose less risky and less productive
innovations, so that the ex post distribution of productivities is endogenously less dispersed when ﬁnancing frictions are
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in more developed economies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a simple model of trade with liquidity con-
straints and heterogeneous ﬁrms. Section 3 describes the impact of exchange rate ﬂuctuations in the presence of liquidity
constraints.2. A model of trade with liquidity constrained exporters
In this section, I develop a model of international trade with liquidity constrained ﬁrms with heterogeneous ﬁrms á la
Melitz (2003).
There are 2 countries, home and foreign, that produce goods using only labor. All foreign variables are denoted by an
asterisk. The home country has a population L (Ln for the foreign country). There are 2 sectors. One sector provides a single
homogeneous good that can be freely traded. This good is used as the numeraire, and its price is set equal to 1. It is produced
under constant returns to scale. The unit labor requirement for producing the homogeneous good at home is 1=w (1=w
abroad). Provided that each country produces the homogeneous good, the wages will be w and wn. I shall only consider
equilibria where this assumption holds. The other sector supplies a continuum of differentiated goods. Each ﬁrm is a
monopolist for the variety it produces.
2.1. Demand
The workers are the only consumers, each endowed with one unit of labor. They all share the same CES preferences over
the differentiated good. A consumer that consumes qo units of the homogeneous good, q xð Þ units of each variety x of the
differentiated good, for all varieties x in the set X (to be determined in equilibrium) has a utility U:
U  q1μo
Z
xAX
qðxÞσ  1σ dx
  σ
σ  1μ
with σ41
where σ is the elasticity of substitution between two varieties of the differentiated good.
If all varieties in the set X are available domestically, at a price pðxÞ each, the ideal price index for differentiated goods is:
P ¼
Z
xAX
pðxÞ1σ dx
  1
1 σ
ð1Þ
The representative consumer has an isoelastic demand function for each differentiated variety. She spends rðxÞ on each
variety x:
r xð Þ ¼ μwL pðxÞ
P
 1σ
ð2Þ
where μwL is the total expenditure spent on differentiated goods.
2.2. Production and trade
There are two types of trade barriers, a ﬁxed cost and a variable cost. If a ﬁrm exports, it must pay a ﬁxed cost, composed
of domestic and foreign labor. The foreign labor part of the ﬁxed cost is denoted ϕCfw, measured in units of the numeraire,
and the domestic part 1ϕð ÞCfw. The parameter ϕ is an index of the foreign labor content of ﬁxed export costs, which may
vary across sectors or across countries. The assumption that at least part of the entry cost into the foreign market is
denominated in foreign labor is important. An exporter must cover costs both in domestic and in foreign labor. I only need
to assume that the part of the ﬁxed entry cost denominated in foreign labor is positive ðϕ40Þ. Campa and Goldberg (2010)
show evidence that between 50 and 70% of the cost of entering foreign markets are denominated in foreign currency. This
part consists of the cost of acquiring local information, setting up a local distribution network, and customizing goods to ﬁt
the local market. The second, variable, trade cost takes the form of an “iceberg” transportation cost. If one unit of any
differentiated good is shipped abroad, only a fraction 1=τ arrives. The rest melts on the way. The higher τ, the higher the
variable trade cost.
Each country has access to the same technology. The marginal product of labor is constant. In order to start production, a
ﬁrm must pay a ﬁxed entry cost Cd in terms of domestic labor, at a cost wCd in terms of the numeraire. The presence of ﬁxed
entry cost means that ﬁrms operate under increasing returns to scale. Each ﬁrm in the differentiated sector draws a random
unit labor productivity xZ0. For a ﬁrm with productivity x, the cost of producing qd units of good for the home market is
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, and the cost of producing qf units for the foreign market is cf ðqf Þ:
cd qd
 ¼ qdwx þwCd
cf qf
 
¼ qf
τw
x
þ 1ϕð ÞwCf þϕwCf
Firms are price setters. Given that demand functions are isoelastic, the optimal price is a constant mark-up over the unit
cost (including transportation costs),
pd xð Þ ¼
σ
σ1
w
x
at home; pf xð Þ ¼
σ
σ1
τw
x
abroad
Given these pricing strategies, more productive ﬁrms are able to charge lower prices, capture a larger market share, and
generate larger proﬁts, both at home and abroad. A ﬁrm with productivity x potentially generates proﬁts πdðxÞ in the
domestic market, and πf ðxÞ in the foreign market:
πd xð Þ ¼
rdðxÞ
σ
wCd ¼
μ
σ
wL
σ
σ1
w
xP
 1 σ
wCd
πf xð Þ ¼
rf ðxÞ
σ
 1ϕð ÞwCf ϕwCf ¼
μ
σ
wL
σ
σ1
τw
xP
 1 σ
 1ϕð ÞwCf ϕwCf
Only those ﬁrms that can proﬁtably produce domestically will survive, and only those ﬁrms that can proﬁtably produce
for the export market could export. xd is the productivity threshold for survival on the domestic market, and xf for proﬁtable
entry into the foreign market, absent any additional constraint. Only those ﬁrms that generate non-negative proﬁts from
domestic sales survive, and only those ﬁrms that generate non-negative proﬁts from selling in the foreign market could
export. The productivity thresholds are deﬁned by,1
πdðxdÞ ¼ 0 and πf ðxf ¼ 0 ð3Þ
Absent any other friction, all ﬁrms with a productivity above xf would export. But for the potential asymmetry between
countries, this model is almost identical to the Melitz (2003) model of international trade. Among other things, the only
reason why the export status of a ﬁrm is correlated to the size of its domestic sales is that more productive ﬁrms sell more
and are more likely to export. There is no direct link between what a ﬁrm exports, how many countries it exports to, and
what it does at home.
In the next section, I introduce liquidity constraints. Financial imperfections create a link between different markets, and
modify the adjustment to changes in exogenous variables.
2.3. Liquidity constraints
With perfect ﬁnancial markets, any ﬁrm that could proﬁtably export will ﬁnd some investors to ﬁnance the entry cost
into the foreign market. However, there are practical reasons to believe that such investments may not be easy to ﬁnance.
The nature of the contracting and informational environment is different from a similar entry cost investment made
domestically. This is mainly due to two factors. First, export activities are essentially riskier than domestic ones. Part of it is
due to the objective added risks, such as foreign exchange risk. Existing ﬁnancial hedging products such as swaps and
options may not be available, or available at a prohibitive cost for most potential exporters. Information about foreign
markets is more difﬁcult and more expensive to acquire, and is less veriﬁable. Since such information is more difﬁcult to
verify than similar information on domestic markets, a potential investor may not be willing to trust a would-be exporter.
Second, the contracting environment for international transactions is relatively weak. For example, it may be more difﬁcult
for investors to collect the proceeds of such sales in case of disagreement. In other words, a potential exporter cannot pledge
much of its foreign activities as collateral, and this translates into ex ante under-investment.
A symmetric problem applies for foreign investors: informational asymmetries and contract incompleteness plague such
relations. A foreign investor has little information on foreign ﬁrms. If she does enter in a relationship with a foreign ﬁrm, and
if the terms of their contract are violated, she will ﬁnd it difﬁcult to seize the ﬁrm's assets. Arguably, trade credits will
alleviate some of these issues. However, trade credits are typically offered to existing exporters, that is ﬁrms with a known
and veriﬁable history of exports into a given market. Such a ﬁrm arguably has already covered most of the entry cost into
foreign markets.
In the remaining part of this paper, I take an extreme view on the limitations of ﬁnancial markets that potential exporters
face. A ﬁrm may ﬁnd investors for any investment regarding domestic activities, but none whatsoever for exporting
activities. Therefore, a ﬁrm must rely on its own existing liquidity to cover entry costs into foreign markets. Moreover, ﬁrms
inherit an exogenous amount of assets. Those assets vary depending on the ﬁrm's history of accumulating cash, on the1 Note that ðxf =xdÞσ1 ¼ ðτσ1Cd=Cf Þ  ðL=LÞ  ðP=PÞ. I assume that trade barriers are always sufﬁciently high (τσ1Cd=Cf sufﬁciently high) so that
xf4xd always holds. Only a subset of ﬁrms are able to export, and no ﬁrm is able to sell abroad but not domestically.
T. Chaney / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 72 (2016) 141–154146pledgeability of its assets, on the current market price of these assets. In Chaney et al. (2012), we explore for instance
variations in local real estate prices as a source of variation of the market, and collateral, value of a ﬁrm's real estate
holdings. This is an extreme and oversimpliﬁed view of liquidity constraints. These assumptions are designed to carry two
properties. First, liquidity constraints are more severe for international trade than for domestic trade. Second, ﬁrms are more
or less severely hampered by liquidity constraints, and how much constraints they face is not perfectly correlated with their
current productivity.
Liquidity constraints are formalized in the following way. Firms only face liquidity constraints for accessing foreign markets.
A ﬁrm that wants to export needs to have enough liquidity on its own to cover the ﬁxed cost of entering foreign markets.
I further assume that each ﬁrm is endowed with pledgeable assets A. A is denominated in units of domestic labor, and has a
value wA in terms of the numeraire. The proﬁts generated from domestic sales, πdðxÞ, can also be used as a source of internal
ﬁnancing for the export ﬁxed cost. So more productive and larger ﬁrms tend to be less liquidity constrained (they generate
more cash). The correlation between size and liquidity constraints is not perfect, as ﬁrms with the same domestic cash ﬂow
stream πdðxÞ may own assets of different pledgeable values. ðA; xÞ is drawn from a joint distribution with c.d.f. FðA; xÞ over
Rþ  Rþ , and FxðxÞ  limA-1 FðA; xÞ over Rþ . I remain agnostic on the shape of the joint distribution FðA; xÞ. This object can
typically be observed in the data, and so the model generates sharp empirical prediction, for any given joint distribution FðA; xÞ.
I also assume that the total mass of ﬁrms is proportional to the size of the country, L.2
In order to export, a ﬁrm must have enough liquidity to cover the ﬁxed entry cost, 1ϕð ÞwCf þϕwCf . The ﬁrm generates
some cash ﬂows from domestic sales, πdðxÞ, and it has access to some additional exogenous pledgeable assets wA. So an
exporter is subject to the following liquidity constraint,
πdðxÞþwAZ 1ϕð ÞwCf þϕwCf ð4Þ
More productive ﬁrms generate larger proﬁts at home, and therefore are less dependent on external ﬁnance. xðAÞ is deﬁned
as the lowest productivity below which ﬁrms with liquidity A cannot gather enough liquidity to enter the foreign market.
xðAÞ is deﬁned by,
πd xðAÞð ÞþwA¼ 1ϕð ÞwCf þϕwCf
All ﬁrms with a productivity below xðAÞ are prevented from exporting because of liquidity constraints, even if they could
proﬁtably export.
2.4. Open economy equilibrium
To focus on what happens in the home country, I assume that foreign ﬁrms face no liquidity constraint, and make one
additional simplifying assumption: price indices only depend on prices set by local ﬁrms. In other words, prices set by
foreign exporters have a negligible impact on the general price index domestically. Formally, the price index equation (1) is
approximated by,
P 
Z
xZxd
pdðxÞ1 σL dFxðxÞ
  1
1 σ
ð5Þ
It will be convenient to deﬁne the function gðÞ in the following way:
g ð Þ: xσ1 ¼ σ
μ
Z
xZx
xσ1 dFx xð Þ
 
 C3x ¼ g Cð Þ ð6Þ
It is straightforward to prove that g040. Rearranging the conditions for the productivity thresholds in Eq. (3) and the
liquidity constraints condition in Eq. (4),
xd ¼ g Cdð Þ ð7Þ
xf ¼
τw
w
  Cf
Cd
ϕþ 1ϕð Þw
w
   1σ  1
g Cd
  ð8Þ
x Að Þ ¼
Cdþ 1ϕð ÞCf þ
w
w
ϕCf A
Cd
0
B@
1
CA
1
σ  1
g Cdð Þ ð9Þ
All the ﬁrms with a productivity above xd produce and sell their output domestically. Only those ﬁrms with a productivity
above max xf ; xðAÞ
 	
are able to export.
What are the determinants of the liquidity constraint, xðAÞ, in Eq. (9)? xðAÞ is a downward sloping schedule. Firms that only own
a small amount of pledgeable assets, A small, must have a high level of productivity in order to generate sufﬁcient liquidity on their2 Bonﬁglioli et al. (2015) propose an elegant model with ﬁnancing frictions and endogenous entry, where the presence of ﬁnancing frictions sys-
tematically affects the ex post distribution of productivities.
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additional liquidity, and do not need a high productivity in order to be able to export. The higher the entry cost into the foreign
country, Cf, the higher the curve xðAÞ. The ﬁxed overhead production cost, Cd, has an ambiguous impact on the curve xðAÞ.3 An
increase of the domestic ﬁxed cost Cd eats up part of a ﬁrm's liquidity, and reduces its ability to enter foreign markets. However, an
increase in Cd also makes it harder for ﬁrms to survive, and forces some domestic ﬁrms out of business. This softens competition,
increases the market share of each surviving ﬁrm, increases proﬁts, and hence increases available liquidity. Which force dominates
depends on the underlying distribution of ﬁrm productivity. The higher the exchange rate, that is the lower w=w, the lower the
curve xðAÞ. The reason is straightforward: if the exchange rate appreciates (w=w falls), the value of domestic assets in terms of
foreign prices increases, and less domestic liquidity is required to enter the foreignmarket. Themore substitutable the goods, that is
the higher σ, the ﬂatter xðAÞ. This is because when goods are highly substitutable, any small difference in productivity implies large
differences in proﬁts, and therefore in the liquidity generated by domestic sales.
Interestingly, only a subset of ﬁrms are potentially subject to liquidity constraints. Firms with a very high productivity, no
matter how little exogenous liquidity they own, are able to export. Formally, xð0Þ is bounded, so that ﬁrms with a pro-
ductivity above xð0Þ do not need any exogenous liquidity. At the other extreme, ﬁrms with a sufﬁciently large amount of
exogenous liquidity do not need to generate any additional liquidity from domestic sales. If their exogenous liquidity
endowment A is sufﬁciently large to cover the ﬁxed entry cost into both the domestic and the foreign market, even without
any domestic sales, those ﬁrms could export.4 In formal terms, x Cdþ 1ϕð ÞCf þwwϕCf
 ¼ 0. From a social efﬁciency point of
view, there is no need to allocate exogenous liquidity beyond Cdþ 1ϕð ÞCf þwwϕCf . We will see in the next section that
proﬁtability conditions imply that the maximum liquidity a ﬁrm could ever need to enter foreign markets is actually below
CdþwwCf . We can already see that the distribution of liquidity among ﬁrms (and how that correlates with a ﬁrm's pro-
ductivity) will have important implications for the ability of ﬁrms to export.
We have seen that a ﬁrm's productivity may allow it to overcome liquidity constraints without the need to accessing
ﬁnancial markets. Are liquidity constraints going to be binding for any ﬁrm? In other words, is any ﬁrm proﬁtable enough to
be a viable exporter, but prevented from accessing foreign markets because of liquidity constraints? The following pro-
position gives conditions under which there will be a set of liquidity constrained exporters.
Proposition 1. If C

d
Cd
Cdþ 1ϕð ÞCf þw

w ϕCf
ϕCf þ 1ϕð Þ wwCf
  1
σ  1 g Cdð Þ
g Cdð Þ4
τw
w, then there is a non-empty set of liquidity constrained ﬁrms (denoted Ω).
These ﬁrms could proﬁtably export, but are prevented from doing so because they lack sufﬁcient liquidity.
Proof. See Appendix B. □
From now on, I assume that the condition in Proposition 1 holds, so that the set of liquidity constrained ﬁrms, Ω, is non-empty.
No ﬁrm with a productivity below xf could proﬁtably export. These ﬁrms have a productivity too low to allow them to
generate enough proﬁts in the foreign market to recover the ﬁxed entry cost. Firms with a productivity above xð0Þ export no
matter how little pledgeable assets they hold: they are competitive enough in the foreign market to generate positive proﬁts,
and they generate sufﬁcient liquidity from their domestic activities to cover the entry cost into the foreign market, without the
need for external ﬁnancing. Firms with an intermediate productivity, xfrxoxð0Þ, could proﬁtably export, but do not generate
sufﬁcient liquidity from their sales on the domestic market. They need extra liquidity. Without pledgeable assets, despite being
proﬁtable, they would be prevented from exporting. This is shown in Fig. 1. The dark shaded area Ω corresponds to liquidity
constrained ﬁrms: these ﬁrms are willing to export ðxZxf Þ, but cannot do so because they lack sufﬁcient liquidity ðxrxðAÞÞ.
It is interesting to note that the distribution of liquidity among ﬁrms does matter. As can be seen graphically, ﬁrms with
more than A (with xðAÞ ¼ xf ) pledgeable assets have “too much” liquidity. A corresponds to the amount of liquidity the least
productive exporter would need to enter foreign markets. Any ﬁrm with a productivity below xf could not export, and
therefore would have no use for exogenous liquidity. Following a similar reasoning, no ﬁrm with a productivity above xð0Þ
has the need for any pledgeable assets. Such high productivity ﬁrms are already able to generate sufﬁcient liquidity from
their domestic sales, and do not need additional source of funding. Only ﬁrms with an intermediate levels of productivity
(between xf and xð0Þ) must have access to some exogenous source of liquidity in order to overcome ﬁnancial constraints.
However none of these ﬁrms would need more than a maximum A of liquidity. I describe in the next section how the
distribution of wealth matters for aggregate exports in the next section.
Proposition 1 is testable. It states that ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms cannot export. Financially constrained ﬁrms are ﬁrms
that both lack sufﬁcient pledgeable assets, and are not productive enough to generate sufﬁcient liquidity on their own.
Campa and Shaver (2001) ﬁnd that more liquidity constrained ﬁrms are less likely to export. They deﬁne ﬁnancially con-
strained ﬁrms as ﬁrms for which investment is correlated with cash ﬂows. In my model, ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms in my
model, that is ﬁrms that both lack pledgeable assets and generate insufﬁcient liquidity from their sales, correspond to
Campa and Shaver's category of ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms. Therefore there is some evidence supporting Proposition 1:
there exists a set of ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms that are prevented from exporting.3 See Appendix A for a formal proof of this statement.
4 Note however that such wealthy ﬁrms may not be able to survive in the domestic market, or proﬁtably export. This is precisely described in the next
section.
Fig. 1. Liquidity constrained exporters. Notes: A is the ﬁrm's exogenous liquidity, and x its productivity. No ﬁrm with a productivity below xf can proﬁtably
export. On top of this, ﬁrms below the curve xðAÞ are liquidity constrained. All ﬁrms in the area Ω between xf and xðAÞ are liquidity constrained exporters.
They could proﬁtably export, but are prevented from doing so because of liquidity constraints.
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If it does export, the total value of exports (f.o.b.) by a ﬁrm with productivity x is rf ðxÞ. Using the expressions for the
productivity thresholds in Eqs. (7)–(9), plugging those and the price index Eq. (5) back into the revenue Eq. (2),
rf xð Þ ¼ σ 1ϕð ÞwCf þϕwCf
  w
τw
 x
xd
 σ1
ð10Þ
All ﬁrms with a productivity above max xf ; xðAÞ
 	
export. All ﬁrms in the set Ω are prevented from exporting. The total
volume of missing trade (f.o.b.) from these constrained exporters, Tmissing, and the total volume of exports (f.o.b.), T total, are
given by,
Tmissing ¼ L
ZZ
ðA;xÞAΩ
rf ðxÞ dFðA; xÞ
T total ¼ L
Z
xZxf
rf ðxÞ dFxðxÞTmissing
The total volume of missing trade depends on several parameters of the distribution of productivity and liquidity shocks.
It depends both on the average liquidity available economy wide and on the distribution of this liquidity. If only highly
productive ﬁrms are liquidity constrained, there will not be any missing trade. If only those low productivity ﬁrms that
would not export anyway are liquidity constrained, there will not be any missing trade. To get a better understanding of the
magnitude of this missing trade, I consider a special case for the distribution of liquidity and productivity shocks FðA; xÞ.
A simpliﬁed form for the joint distribution of productivity and liquidity shocks, FðA; xÞ allows simple predictions for the
export behavior of liquidity constrained ﬁrms. Assume that the liquidity shocks and the productivity shocks are uncorre-
lated. Further assume that a fraction θ of ﬁrms are liquidity constrained (they hold A pledgeable assets, with AoA), and the
remaining 1θð Þ is not liquidity constrained (they hold pledgeable assets above A). A is deﬁned as the minimum liquidity
above which ﬁnancial constraints are not binding, and the only constraint is the proﬁtability constraint: xðAÞ ¼ xf . Firms
with a high enough positive liquidity shock will always be able to generate enough liquidity on the home market. They will
export only if exporting is proﬁtable. In this special case, Tmissing and T total are given by,
Tmissing ¼ θL
Z xf
xðAÞ
rf ðxÞ dFxðxÞ ð11Þ
T total ¼ L
Z
xZxf
rf ðxÞ dFxðxÞTmissing ð12Þ
Deﬁnition 2. A deepening of ﬁnancial markets corresponds to an increase of A, the amount of pledgeable assets available to
ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms. A widening of ﬁnancial markets corresponds to a reduction in θ, the fraction of ﬁnancially
constrained ﬁrms.
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entiated goods.
Proof. See Appendix C. □
This model predicts that ﬁnancial constraints faced by potential exporters have a negative impact on trade ﬂows. Both
the absolute amount of liquidity and the distribution of liquidity among ﬁrms matter for the total volume of trade in
differentiated goods. These predictions are testable. The model predicts that more ﬁnancially constrained industries should
have lower trade ﬂows. Sectors where the distribution of liquidity is more unequal should have lower trade ﬂows. Moreover,
ﬁnancial constraints matter more when entry costs to foreign markets are larger (Cf large). If those entry costs increase with
distance, more ﬁnancially constrained sectors should have a larger distance elasticity of trade (in absolute value).3. The ambiguous impact of exchange rate shocks on trade ﬂows
In this section, I describe the impact of exchange rate shocks on trade. If the domestic currency appreciates vis á vis the
foreign currency, domestic producers lose competitiveness in the foreign market. This is a classic term of trade effect.
However, an appreciation of the domestic currency relaxes the liquidity constraint faced by potential exporters. The value of
domestic assets in terms of the foreign currency increases. Liquidity constrained ﬁrms are now more likely to be able to pay
foreign denominated part of the ﬁxed export cost and start exporting. Simultaneously, existing exporters lose competi-
tiveness and export less. The least productive among the non-liquidity constrained exporters exit the export market alto-
gether, both because their marginal cost of production appreciates with the domestic currency, and because the domestic
currency denominated part of the ﬁxed export cost increases. The intensive margin of trade is negatively affected by an
appreciation of the exchange rate, whereas the extensive margin is both negatively and positively affected.
I model exchange rate shocks as a shock on relativewages (in terms of the numeraire). An appreciation of the domestic currency
is deﬁned as an increase in the productivity in the homogeneous sector at home, which leads to an increase in the domestic wages
w, all else equal. This deﬁnition is similar to the one used by Atkeson and Burstein (2008). If the domestic wage increases, the value
of domestic assets (wA and πdðxÞ) increases, whereas potential exporters lose competitiveness in the foreign market (pf ðxÞ=P
increases). These effects are exactly equivalent to an appreciation of the domestic currency vis á vis the foreign currency.
Proposition 4. An appreciation of the exchange rate has 3 effects:
(i) Existing exporters lose market shares abroad and reduce their exports: ∂rf ðxÞ∂w o0.
(ii) The least productive non-constrained exporters are forced out of the export market: ∂xf∂w40.
(iii) The most productive constrained ﬁrms start exporting: ∂xðAÞ∂w o0.
Proof. (i) The ﬁrst effect is the classic impact of a loss of competitiveness for exporters. As the value of domestic inputs
increases, domestic exporters have to charge higher prices in order to maintain mark-ups, and therefore they lose market
shares in the foreign market. This loss of market shares implies a reduction in exports. Formally, differentiating Eq. (10) with
respect to w,
∂rf ðxÞ
∂w
¼  σ1ð Þrf ðxÞ
w
o0
(ii) The second effect is the natural corollary of the ﬁrst effect. Exporters lose proﬁts for two reasons. First, they lose
market share and their variable proﬁts fall. Second, the increase in the domestic currency denominated part of the ﬁxed
export cost eats some of their proﬁts.5
∂πf ðxÞ
∂w
¼ σ1
σ
rf ðxÞ
w
 1ϕð ÞCfo0
So the least productive ﬁrms, earning smaller proﬁts, cannot cover the entry cost into the foreign market anymore. The
productivity threshold xf goes up. Formally, differentiating Eq. (8) with respect to w,
∂xf
∂w
¼ xf
w
1þ
Cf
Cd
1ϕð Þw
w
Cdþ 1ϕð ÞCf þ
w
w
ϕCf A
Cd
0
BBBBB@
1
CCCCCA
405 I am grateful to Mario Crucini for suggesting to introduce a domestic denominated part to the ﬁxed export cost.
Fig. 2. The ambiguous impact of an exchange rate appreciation. Notes: A is the ﬁrm's exogenous liquidity, and x its productivity. An appreciation of the
domestic currency erodes the competitiveness of exporters, and forces the least productive exporters to exit (light shaded area). At the same time, it relaxes
the liquidity constraint, and allows some liquidity constrained ﬁrms to enter the export market (dark shaded area).
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the value of domestic assets (both exogenous liquidity and endogenous domestic proﬁts) in terms of foreign currency
increases. Since the entry cost into the foreign market is paid in foreign currency, this means a relaxation of the liquidity
constraint for constrained exporters. Formally, differentiating Eq. (9) with respect to w,
∂xðAÞ
∂w
¼  1
σ1
  w
w
ϕCf
Cdþ 1ϕð ÞCf þ
w
w
ϕCf A
 xðAÞ
w
o0 □
An appreciation of the exchange rate causes both entry and exit. Non-liquidity constrained ﬁrms with a low productivity
are forced out of the export market because they lose competitiveness in the foreign market and they face higher export
costs (the domestic currency denominated part). Liquidity constrained ﬁrms with a high productivity (close to xðAÞ) face a
relaxed liquidity constraint and enter the export market.
This can be seen in Fig. 2. Low productivity non-constrained ﬁrms, in the light shaded area, exit the export market. This is
due to the fact that they lose competitiveness in the foreign market and face a higher ﬁxed export cost, and therefore earn
less proﬁts. They cannot cover the ﬁxed trade barrier any more, and exit the export market. At the same time, high pro-
ductivity constrained ﬁrms, in the dark shaded area, enter the export market. These ﬁrms are sufﬁciently productive to
export (even after the currency appreciation), but they were prevented from doing so because of liquidity constraints. The
appreciation of their currency increases the value of their domestic assets, relaxes their liquidity constraint, and allows them
to start exporting. Depending both on the strength of the liquidity constraints (the overall scarcity of liquidity in the
economy) and on the number of liquidity constrained ﬁrms, either effect can dominate. If there are relatively many liquidity
constrained ﬁrms, there will be a net entry of ﬁrms following an appreciation of the exchange rate.
The presence of liquidity constraints introduces an investment motive in international trade in goods. Exports do not
depend only on the competitiveness of exporters, it also depends on the value of domestic assets relative to the “cost” of
exporting. In the same way as an exchange rate appreciation will make investment abroad more accessible, it makes
exporting more likely for a group of ﬁrms.
Proposition 5. If competition is soft (σ close to 1), an appreciation of the exchange rate will have a positive impact on exports of
differentiated goods.
Proof. See Appendix D □
This model of international trade with liquidity constrained exporters predicts that, under some conditions, an appre-
ciation of the exchange rate, despite its negative impact on the competitiveness of exporters, may have a strictly positive
impact on exports of differentiated goods. If competitiveness does not have too large an impact on the size of market shares,
that is if goods are very differentiated (σ low), then the entry of liquidity constrained exporters following an appreciation of
the exchange rate will dominate. Total exports of differentiated goods increase after an appreciation of the exchange rate.
More generally, even if an appreciation of the exchange rate has an negative impact on exports, the negative impact of an
exchange rate appreciation will be milder (or even become positive) the more unequal the distribution of liquidity within
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constrained. This means that many ﬁrms could proﬁtably export, but they lack sufﬁcient access to ﬁnancial markets to cover
the entry cost into the foreign market. If the exchange rate appreciates, the liquidity constraint faced by all those ﬁrms is
relaxed. A fraction of these ﬁrms will then start exporting, despite the loss of competitiveness. The more unequal the
distribution of wealth among ﬁrms, the more ﬁrms will start exporting, and the more positive the impact of a exchange rate
appreciation.
Liquidity constraints for the access to foreign markets allow effective policy interventions. There is room for a temporary
competitive revaluation. A temporary revaluation of the domestic currency, by increasing the value of domestic assets, may
allow liquidity constrained ﬁrms to start exporting. The sunk cost nature of a fraction of ﬁxed costs associated with
exporting implies some asymmetry for the response of trade to exchange rate ﬂuctuations. Once liquidity constrained ﬁrms
have started exporting, insofar as they do not have to pay this ﬁxed cost again, they will continue exporting, even after a
devaluation of their currency.
It may also be possible to extend this model to describe phenomena of ampliﬁcation and contagion in international
trade. If a ﬁrm exports to a given foreign market, it generates some liquidity, in addition to domestic proﬁts. Such extra
liquidity will give this ﬁrm an edge for entering other foreign markets. This corresponds to an ampliﬁcation mechanism: an
increase in exports by a ﬁrm may trigger additional exports, since it relaxes its liquidity constraint. In a multi-country
dynamic setting, ﬁrms may be able to accumulate liquidity from both their domestic sales, and past sales to other foreign
markets. Firms that have already entered many foreign markets are more likely to have sufﬁcient liquidity to enter new and
less accessible markets. Shocks that affect exports with one trading partner may inﬂuence the volume of exports with other
trading partners, even absent any direct link between those countries. If trade links with a given trading partner are severed,
the liquidity streams generated from exporting to this country cease, and some exporters may be forced to pull out of other
markets as well. Moreover, if markets in the same region are characterized by similar trade barriers, they will attract similar
exporters. Modifying the access to one of these markets will affect trade with all other countries in the same region. Hence,
liquidity constraints may artiﬁcially generate contagion phenomena in international trade.4. Conclusion
I have shown in this paper that liquidity constraints may modify fundamentally the behavior of exporters, and the
patterns of aggregate exports. If ﬁrms face liquidity constraints when accessing foreign markets, some ﬁrms are prevented
from exporting. They could proﬁtably enter foreign markets, but are prevented from doing so because they lack the ability to
access ﬁnancial markets and cover entry costs into foreign markets. The main prediction of the model is that ﬁnancial
underdevelopment hinders exports. Both the total amount of liquidity available and the distribution of this liquidity matter
for trade. The model also predicts that the presence of liquidity constraints will reduce the sensitivity of trade ﬂows to
exchange rate ﬂuctuations. When the exchange rate appreciates, exporters lose competitiveness, and they reduce their
exports and the least productive among them exit altogether. However, since the value of domestic assets in terms of foreign
prices increases, liquidity constraints for accessing foreign markets are relaxed. Some ﬁrms start exporting. This entry of
liquidity constrained exporters dampens the negative competitiveness effect of an exchange rate appreciation. Under some
conditions, an exchange rate appreciation may even have a positive impact on exports. Liquidity constraints also create
artiﬁcial links between different markets, and thus generate ampliﬁcation and contagion phenomena.Acknowledgments
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Proof. The function gðCÞ is steeper than C 1σ  1. This can be seen simply by rearranging the deﬁnition of the function gðÞ in
Eq. (6). We can deﬁne the function ξðCÞ in the following way:
ξ Cð Þ  gðCÞ
C
1
σ  1
¼ σ
μ
Z
x4gðCÞ
xσ1 dFx xð Þ
Since gðÞ is increasing in C, ξðÞ is decreasing in C. How steep it is depends on the underlying distribution of productivity Fx.
Depending on this distribution, ξðÞ can be arbitrarily steep, or arbitrarily ﬂat.
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x Að Þ ¼ Cdþ
w
w
Cf A
  1
σ  1
 ξ Cdð Þ
When Cd increases, the ﬁrst term of the product goes up, and the second term goes down. The net effect can go either way,
depending on how steep the function ξðÞ is.
We can describe the intuition behind each term of the product. When the domestic ﬁxed cost goes up, it eats up the
liquidity of all ﬁrms. This pushes up the minimum productivity required for entering foreign markets, at any level of A. This
is the increase in the ﬁrst term of the product.
At the same time, due to the increase in the domestic ﬁxed cost, some ﬁrms are pushed out of business. Some ﬁrms die,
competition softens among survivors, and proﬁts increase. Each surviving ﬁrm now generates more liquidity from its
domestic sales. The minimum productivity required for entering foreign markets falls, at any level of A. This is the reduction
in the second term of the product. □Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 (reminded). If C

d
Cf
þwC

d
wCd
  1
σ  1 g Cdð Þ
g Cdð Þ4
τw
w, then there is a non-empty set of liquidity constrained ﬁrms (denoted
Ω). These ﬁrms could proﬁtably export, but are prevented from doing so because they lack sufﬁcient liquidity.
Proof. All ﬁrms below xðAÞ are liquidity constrained, and cannot export no matter how proﬁtable their exporting would be.
All ﬁrms above xf could proﬁtably export, if they have sufﬁcient liquidity. I want to prove that Ωa∅, with ðA; xÞAΩ iif
xfrxoxðAÞ. Firms in Ω could proﬁtably export ðxZxf Þ, but they are prevented from doing so because they are liquidity
constrained ðxoxðAÞÞ. A necessary and sufﬁcient condition for Ω to be non-empty is that xð0Þ4xf . I know that:
xf ¼
τw
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w, Ω is non-empty, and there are liquidity constrained ﬁrms.□Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 3Proposition 3 (reminded). Both a deepening and a widening of ﬁnancial markets have a positive impact on total trade ﬂows.
Proof. A deepening of the ﬁnancial markets corresponds to a relaxation of the liquidity constraint of constrained ﬁrms (a
reduction of A). A widening of ﬁnancial markets corresponds to a reduction in the number of liquidity constrained ﬁrms (a
reduction of θ). Differentiating the expressions for total trade and missing trade in Eqs. (12) and (11),
∂T total
∂θ
¼ L
Z xf
xðAÞ
rf xð Þ dFx xð Þ
∂T total
∂A
¼ θT∂xðAÞ
∂A
rf xðAÞð Þ
∂Fx
∂x
xðAÞð Þ
Differentiating Eq. (9), ∂xðAÞ∂A ¼  1σ1
  xðAÞ
Cdþ 1ϕð ÞCf þww ϕCf A
o0, which insures that a relaxation of the liquidity constraint has a
positive impact on trade. Therefore,
∂T total
∂θ
o0 and ∂T total
∂A
40 □
T. Chaney / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 72 (2016) 141–154 153Appendix D. Proof of Proposition 5Proposition 5 (reminded). If competition is soft (σ close to 1), an appreciation of the exchange rate will have a positive impact
on exports.
Proof. I can rewrite total exports in Eq. (12) in the following way,
T total ¼
Z
xZxðAÞ
rf ðxÞL dFxðxÞþ 1θð Þ
Z xðAÞ
xf
rf ðxÞL dFxðxÞ
Differentiating this equation with respect to w, and using Leibnitz rule, and applying Lebesgues' theorem of monotone
convergence to insure existence of the integrals,
∂T total
∂w
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Z
xZxðAÞ
∂rf ðxÞ
∂w
L dFx xð Þþ 1θð Þ
Z xðAÞ
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∂w
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L
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r xðAÞð ÞL∂Fx xðAÞð Þ
∂x
Using the formulas for ∂rf ðxÞ=∂w, ∂xf =∂w, and ∂xðAÞ=∂w from the previous proof,
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The ﬁrst two terms in the sum are negative (the loss of competitiveness of existing exporters, and the exit of non liquidity
constrained exporters). The last term is positive (the entry of liquidity constrained exporters).
The ﬁrst two terms are bounded, and the last term converges to inﬁnity as σ converges to 1. In other words, provided that
the loss in competitiveness is not too severe (σ close to 1), the entry of liquidity constrained exporters will dominate the exit
of low productivity unconstrained exporters, and the reduction in exports by existing exporters.□References
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